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Capital market regulators often, but not always, are driven to launch their
most important new regulatory initiatives by scholarly findings in the fields of
finance and law and economics. Sometimes exciting and original social science
scholarship that relates to the law and regulation of capital markets profoundly
influences regulation; sometimes such scholarship is ignored completely. This
brief contribution to the Yale Journal on Regulation is based on a speech given
at the Journal's twenty-fifth anniversary celebration on April 25, 2008, and is a
prelude to a full article on the same topic that will be published in the Winter
2009 issue of the Journal. In both of these contributions I adduce evidence to
support the hypothesis that the truth and intellectual strength of the work does
not seem to be the key driver that determines influence. Rather, political
expediency appears to be the determinative factor. This piece presents a
summary of a few of the major arguments in the forthcoming article.
I. When Scholarship Influences Regulation
The profound influence of social science scholarship on regulation and
litigation has not received the attention it deserves. Without the new insights
provided by legal scholarship, it is likely that none of the three major
regulatory initiatives that have altered the landscape of U.S. capital markets
over the last decade would have occurred. To make this point, the following
three subsections of this Essay discuss each of the pieces of law and finance
scholarship that drove these regulatory initiatives.
A. Odd-Eighth Quotes
The first example of empirical work in social science that launched a
major regulatory response was William Christie and Paul Schultz's article in
the Journal of Finance, "Why Do Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth
t Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law, Yale University.
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Quotes?"' Christie and Schultz examined trading in the Nasdaq stock market,
which, along with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), is one of the two
principal equity-trading markets in the United States. Like other U.S. equity
markets, the NASDAQ stock market competes for listings and for order flow
by offering an attractive trading venue to purchasers and sellers of equity
securities. What Christie and Schultz found was not just price fixing, but
probably the most subtle, ingenious, and successful price fixing scheme since
Adam Smith began to worry about the problem in the eighteenth century. 2 This
discovery led to massive antitrust and securities enforcement efforts that
entailed a private class action lawsuit with a settlement of over $1 billion, an
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice into price fixing that concluded
with total fines on major U.S. investment banks exceeding another $1 billion,
as well as dramatic new regulations and market practices concerning not only
the way orders are handled in the securities markets, but also how securities
prices are quoted.
B. Mutual Fund Late Trading
Another example of empirical scholarship in social science that launched
(literally) a thousand (or more) lawyers into action was work done in 2004 by
Eric Zitzewitz, a young assistant professor at the Stanford Graduate School of
Business. 3 Zitzewitz's work examined trading in U.S. mutual funds. Zitzewitz
pointed out that the prices at which mutual funds bought and sold their own
shares from their investors often were inaccurate. This, in turn, gave crafty
institutional investors such as hedge funds the ability to transfer wealth to
themselves from unsophisticated mutual fund investors. As Zitzewitz described
the problem:
Investors can take advantage of mutual funds that calculate their NAVs
using stale closing prices by trading based on recent market
movements.... For example, if the U.S. market has risen since the
close of overseas equity markets, investors can expect that overseas
equity markets will open higher the following morning. Investors can
buy a fund with a stale-price NAV for less than its current value, and
they can likewise sell a fund for more than its current value on a day
that the U.S. market has fallen.
4
1 William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth
Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994).
2 In Adam Smith's immortal words, "[Pleople of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices." THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Random House 1973) (1776).
3 Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 245 (2003) [hereinafter Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders?]; see also Eric
Zitzewitz, How Widespread Was Late Trading in Mutual Funds?, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 284 (2006).
4 Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders?, supra note 3.
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The SEC clearly was aware of the problems caused by stale pricing.5 The
Commission jawboned the mutual fund industry to eliminate the possibilities of
abuse by using what is known as "fair value pricing." Fair value pricing
involves providing more frequent price updates for securities that have not
traded for a certain period of time. The fair value price is determined on the
basis of the price that an arm's-length buyer would pay for the security at the
relevant time. Interestingly, it appears that when the mutual fund industry
resisted the SEC's efforts to reform the industry's pricing practices, "the SEC
essentially backed down."
6
Elliott Spitzer, then an ambitious, entrepreneurial state Attorney General,
brought an investigation. Ultimately, virtually every major mutual fund
complex was investigated and late trading ground to a virtual halt as a result of
his efforts. These enforcement measures were probably inconsistent with
applicable SEC regulations that clearly permit such activities.
C. Options Backdating
The third major regulatory initiative, which addressed the backdating in
the granting of corporate stock options to corporate executives and other
employees, was years in the making. In 1997, David Yermack, Professor of
Finance at New York University, published a paper on the relationship between
stock prices and option grants. 7 Yermack was interested in the ability of
corporate managers to influence their own compensation. Utilizing a sample of
620 stock option awards to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the largest U.S.
corporations made between 1992 and 1994, Yermack found that the timing of
stock option awards coincided uncannily with favorable movements in
company stock prices. Specifically, CEOs received stock option awards shortly
before favorable corporate news that led to upturns in company share prices.
Professor Yermack was not able to explain whether executives were receiving
stock options at low price points because of luck, prescience, or some other
factor.
Research in 2004 by Professor Erik Lie was the first to suggest a nefarious
explanation for the timing of executive stock option grants. Professor Lie's
research indicated that the best explanation for the timing of stock option grants
5 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS CAN BE
LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE, GAO-05-313 (Apr.
2005); Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
the H. Comm. on lhe Judiciary, W39th Cong. 6 t2W5) lYereinater Mutual Fund Trading Abuses)
(statement of Eric Zitzewitz, Assistant Professor, Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus.) (noting that "the SEC
was aware of inefficiencies in the pricing of mutual fund shares that created arbitrage opportunities").
6 Mutual Fund Trading Abuses, supra note 5, at 3; see also Investment Company Institute,
Valuation Liquidity Issues for Mutual Funds: 2002 Supplement (2002) (white paper); Letter from the
Comm. on Inv. Mgmt. Regulation of the Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y. City to the Sec. and Exch. Comm'n
(June 21, 2001) (cited in Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders?, supra note 3, at 273).
7 David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997).
Yale Journal on Regulation
might be rather unsavory. He posited that the available evidence was consistent
with the theory that public companies were backdating stock-option grant dates
to enrich their senior executives.
Options backdating is the practice of granting an employee a stock option
that permits the grantee to purchase shares at a lower price recorded on a date
prior to the date that the company actually granted the option. For example,
suppose that a company's share price was $25 per share on March 1, 2008, but
has risen to $35 per share on April 30. Clearly, an option to purchase stock in
the company at the lower March 1 price is more valuable than an option to
purchase stock in the same company at the higher April 30 price. Such
backdating raises potential legal and regulatory reporting and disclosure
problems.
Professor Lie extended the earlier work of Professor Yermack by
examining options grants by companies that granted options to executives in
consecutive years, but not on the same day every year. Professor Lie
discovered a pattern: stock prices systematically tended to fall just prior to the
date on which the options were said to have been granted, but they rose almost
immediately after the grant. In other words, if one thinks of a stock-price chart,
options were granted at a dip in the market price that preceded a price increase.
Of equal interest to Professor Lie was the fact that the options granted to lucky
executives did not always precede good news about the particular company for
which an executive worked. Instead, options often appeared to have been
granted just prior to increases in stock prices for the entire stock market that
had nothing to do with any events in the company granting the options. In other
words, the executives receiving stock options grants not only appear to have
been very prescient about news at their own firms; they also appeared to have
been very prescient about the stock market in general. These results led
Professor Lie to the conclusion that "at least some of the awards are timed
retroactively."
'8
Dr. Lie actually sent a copy of his article to the SEC in early 2004 and
later received an acknowledgement stating it was "interesting." 9 Then, in
March 2004, building on Lie's work, the Wall Street Journal printed a story on
the front page that reported on Lie's study and used its own statistical analysis
to identify several companies with highly suspicious grant practices. Among
other findings, the Wall Street Journal looked at several option grants made to
Jeffrey Rich, the former chief executive officer of Affiliated Computer
Services, Inc. Ostensibly, all of these grants were made immediately prior to
sharp spikes in Affiliated's share prices. The Journal estimated that the odds
against this happening by chance were 300 billion-to-one, twice as bad as the
146 billion-to-one odds against winning the Powerball lottery with a $1
8 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT SC. 802 (2005).




ticket.10 After that, the SEC, DOJ and state enforcement actions came fast and
furious.
II. When Scholarship Fails to Influences Regulation
Interestingly, while scholarship in the above cases led to massive
regulatory efforts, sometimes equally important scholarship simply is ignored.
In this Part of this Essay, I analyze the question of why regulators sometimes
choose to ignore important scholarship.
A. Insider Trading in Congress
In a fascinating 2004 article in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis called "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the
U.S. Senate," Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, and Brigitte J.
Ziobrowski show that U.S. Senators are able to use their inside information
about forthcoming government action to obtain significant positive abnormal
returns on their equity investments. Specifically, the authors examine the
common stock investments of members of the U.S. Senate during the period
1993-1998 and demonstrate that the stock market trades of U.S. Senators beat
the market by the astonishing amount of 97 basis points per month (85 basis
points on purchases, 12 basis points on sales). This difference in the returns of
stocks bought and sold (nearly one percentage point per month) is
economically large and reliably positive. Senators showed a remarkable ability
to buy stocks at their lowest prices and to sell them at their highest prices
during a given period.'" In response to the "shocking" news of public officials
using their official positions for personal gain, Louise Slaughter, the chair of
the House Rules Committee (D-NY) and Brian Baird (D-WA) proposed the
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act. 12 The proposed legislation was
killed in congressional committee. Clearly, the SEC did not want to offend the
politicians that both oversee the agency and determine its funding.
B. The Prosecution ofArthur Andersen
The government's criminal prosecution of Arthur Andersen was a direct
response to the public outcry over Enron's collapse. When Enron imploded in a
10 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday: Some CEOs Reap Millions by
Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck-Or Something Else?, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 2006, at Al. When queried about his options grants by the Wall Street Journal, Mr. Rich denied that
his options had been backdated and attributed the fortuitous timing of the options grants to "blind luck."
Id.
II Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the
U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 661 (2004).
12 The Act was first proposed as H.R. 5015 in the 109th Congress. Since mid-2007 the Act
has been stalled in Congress as H.R. 2341, and appears likely to be stalled in Committee.
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flurry of corporate governance and accounting scandals, a special task force
was established within the Department of Justice to prosecute those thought to
be responsible for the scandals. One of the major targets of this task force was
Enron's accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, which was indicted for obstruction
of justice in its handling of certain documents related to its audits of Enron.
The government justified its indictment of Arthur Andersen on the grounds that
Andersen was significantly more corrupt and susceptible to capture by its
clients than rival auditing firms.
The criminal prosecution of Andersen was simply a reflection of the
government's decision to operationalize its assumption that Andersen's
pathologies, whatever they might be, were unique among the major accounting
firms. As one commentator observed, "[T]he Justice Department's decision to
bring criminal charges against Andersen and not against any other major
accounting firm supports the view that Andersen deserved to be singled out for
special treatment." 13 In other words, the Justice Department's prosecution of
Arthur Andersen reflects only the government belief (or assertion of belief) that
Andersen deserved to be singled out for special treatment.
The government's criminal charges led directly to the demise of
Andersen, 14  notwithstanding the fact that Andersen's conviction was
overturned unanimously by the U.S. Supreme Court.15 The prosecution of
Andersen eliminated for all time one of the very few major audit firms capable
of auditing the largest U.S. public corporations.
In an earlier article jointly authored with Ted Eisenberg, I examined
Andersen's relative performance, as measured by whether Andersen's clients
issued and filed erroneous financial statements that they had to later restate
more often than the other large auditing firms. 16 The Eisenberg-Macey analysis
of about 1000 large, public firms from 1997-2001 yielded no evidence that
Andersen's performance as an auditor was any different than the performance
of its peer group of auditing firms.17 Andersen's clients did not restate their
13 Pomsit Jiraporn, Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance, and Auditor Selection:
Evidence from Arthur Andersen (Feb. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-926746).
14 Federal regulations forbid convicted felons to audit public companies. On August 31, 2002,
in the wake of its conviction on June 15, 2002, Andersen surrendered its license as a Certified Public
Accountant. This ended the firm's ability to do business. Andersen never returned to business, even
though his conviction was overturned in 2005.
15 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (vacating Arthur Andersen's
conviction for obstruction of justice). The Court held that the instructions to the jury were fatally flawed
because they permitted Andersen to be convicted regardless of whether Andersen was aware that it had
broken the law. The opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, emphasized that "the jury instructions at
issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is striking how little
culpability the instructions required." Id. at 706.
16 Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263
(2004).
17 Consistent with the empirical results that Eisenberg and I reported, the international
accounting firm Deloitte & Touche published an audit quality peer review of Andersen in January of
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financial results at a significantly different rate than the other major accounting
firms during this period. During the period of our study, private plaintiffs and
government regulators began to focus more intensively on accounting
irregularities, and the percentage of public companies restating their financial
results increased dramatically. Interestingly, however, we did not find a
significant rise in Andersen's share of the increased number of restatements.
Rather, the distribution of restatements among the largest accounting firms
remained roughly the same.
Thus, by the restatement-rate measure, the vilified and now-defunct
Andersen was not objectively different from the other major accounting firms.
The stakes of accurately describing Andersen's performance in auditing public
companies were high. Remarkably few large accounting firms audit multiple
large, public corporations. Removing a major firm from such a thin market has
had dramatic implications for the public securities markets as well as for the
accounting industry as a whole. Independent of Andersen's particular
performance, the stakes of understanding the pattern of financial restatements
are also high.
C. Quacking about Regulation and Ignoring the Evidence: Sarbanes-Oxley
Another example of policymakers' ability to ignore scientific evidence
when it is convenient for them to do so is reflected in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002.18 As Roberta Romano demonstrated in her article Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,19 Sarbanes-Oxley, arguably the
most important federal statute in the area of corporate law and corporate
governance, was passed without any attention to the available social-scientific
evidence in finance and economics.
Romano's key contribution is to point out that Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was
enacted against a background of existing social science research that might
have been deployed to inform the contents of the statute, but was not.
Specifically, Romano "evaluates SOX's substantive governance provisions and
the political dynamics that produced them from the perspective of the
substantial body of empirical accounting and finance literature related to those
2002. This peer review is regarded as highly comprehensive. It covered 240 Andersen engagements in
thirty offices. The review concluded that "Andersen's system of accounting and audit quality provided
reasonable assurance of compliance with professional standards." Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich,
Shredded Reputation: The Cost ofAudit Failure, 40 J. ACCT. REs. 1221 (2002). A study has shown that
Arthur Andersen clients reported bad news in a less timely fashion than other accounting firms, but this
study focuses only on clients in Andersen's Houston office, which, unlike the rest of Andersen, likely
was captured by at least some of its audit clients. See Gopal V. Krishnan, Did Houston Clients ofArthur
Andersen Recognize Publicly Available Bad News in a Timely Fashion?, 22 CONTEMP. ACCOUNTING
REs. 165 (2005).
18 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
19 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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provisions., 20 As Romano points out, "the gist" of the extant empirical social
science literature in financial economics made it clear that "the proposed
mandates would not be effective," and this literature "was available to
legislators while they were formulating SOX." 21 In other words, the new
provisions of SOX imposed reforms that the existing social science literature
had found to be ineffective. Moreover, the substantive provisions of SOX did
not even have a nexus to the problems within Enron that led to the firm's
collapse.22
Romano focuses on three substantive provisions of SOX that relate to the
internal corporate governance of publicly traded companies subject to the
SEC's jurisdiction. These provisions: (1) require corporations to have audit
committees that are "independent;" 23 (2) restrict the ability of corporations to
obtain consulting services and other non-audit related services from their
auditors; 24 (3) prohibit corporate loans to their officers; 25 and (4) require new
"certifications" of the integrity of financial statements by the Chief Executive
Officers and the Chief Financial Officers of the public companies that issue
such statements.
26
For each of these issues, Romano conducts a thorough review of the
literature, concluding that the provisions of SOX represent public policy errors
inconsistent with the available statistical evidence in finance and economics.
27
In other words, as Romano observes, the empirical literature "suggests that a
case does not exist for the principal corporate governance mandates in SOX."
28
Thus, SOX is yet another example of a statute that ignores the available social
science literature, where the narrow political interests of the politicians
supporting the legislation were at odds with the scientific truth.
20 Id. at 1526.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1526 ("What is perhaps most striking is how successful policy entrepreneurs were in
opportunistically coupling their corporate governance proposals to Enron's collapse, offering as
ostensible remedies for future 'Enrons' reforms that had minimal or absolutely no relation to the source
of that firm's demise.").
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 775-77 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)).
24 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771-72 (2002) (codified
as amended at Securities Exchange Act § 10A(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)).
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C § 78m(k)).
26 Id. § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777-78 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). Other
provisions of SOX relate to such things as increased disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions and the
creation of a new agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the
accounting industry, and protections for whistleblowers.
27 Romano, supra note 19, at 1529-53.
28 Id. at 1543.
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III. Policy and Political Entrepreneurship
The analysis and evidence in this Essay reveal much about the relevance
of scholarship to policymaking. Scholarship is a tool used by entrepreneurial
policymakers to justify the launch of salient, high profile, and politically
important enforcement initiatives.
Press coverage is an important, but not an essential part of this story. By
this I mean that the regulatory response of a particular piece of scholarship in
law and finance may occur in response to coverage of the scholarship in the
popular press. In other words, the financial press often appears to translate the
empirical work of economists into terms that regulators and politicians can
understand. And, of course, the revelation in the press of abusive practices may
incite the public to demand some sort of regulatory intervention. On the other
hand, as in the case of insider trading in the Senate, there is no regulatory
response to important scholarship, despite widespread press coverage. This is
because sometimes inaction is in the interests of the regulators involved.
Journalists themselves understand this, of course. The SEC was aware of the
evidence that U.S. Senators were abusing insider information to make trading
profits, but as one source put it:
[S]urprise, surprise, it seems that they are too busy going after Martha Stewart to
have the time to look into evidence that our leaders are using their political
power and influence for personal gain. An article in the Philadelphia Inquirer
notes slyly, "the SEC may have little incentive to tangle with the Senate, given
their relationship. Senators approve members of the SEC's governing body, as
well as the agency's budget.' 2
In other words, regulators are opportunistic in deciding when to use, and
when to ignore, the results generated by social science research in law and
finance. When regulators and policy-makers find it politically expedient to act,
as they did in the cases of Arthur Andersen and Enron, scholarship sometimes
gets in their way. When this happens, politicians react either by not making the
obviously inquiry, or by ignoring the immediately available and highly relevant
evidence. On the other hand, when regulators and policymakers find it
politically expedient to do nothing, as they have in the case of insider trading
by members of Congress, politicians react in the same way: by ignoring the
immediately available and highly relevant evidence.
29 See Alex Tabarrok, Senatorial Privilege, MARGINAL REVOLUTION, Nov. 3 2004,
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/1 I/senatorial-priv.html.

